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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PAM JOY REALTY, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 940662-CA
vs.

Priority No. 15

5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah
limited liability company, and
JOHN DOES 1-10, unknown
individuals,
Defendants and Appellee.

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge

APPELLEE'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third Judi-

cial District Court. Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was made
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, which grants
appellate jurisdiction in connection with judgments over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction. Thereafter the Supreme Court poured-over the case to the Court of
- 1 -

Appeals for disposition.

Jurisdiction is not contested by the

parties.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The precise issues for the court to review in this case are
the following:
1.

Whether the parol evidence rule as a matter of law bars

appellant from changing the terms of the parties unambiguous
written contracts.
2.

Whether under the legal doctrine of "merger" the final

intention of the parties was, as a matter of law, merged into the
final written contracts of the parties.
3.

Whether there are undisputed material facts that would

bar appellant's claim of intentional misrepresentation.
4.

Whether there are undisputed material facts that would

bar appellant's claim of negligent misrepresentation.
5.

Whether the necessary elements exist in this case to

reform the written agreements of the parties.
Appellee agrees with appellant that all of the above represent issues of law to be reviewed by the Appellate Court under a
correctness standard.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or
statutes. This appeal involves interpretation of the common
law1.
- 2 -

1

§68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated adopts the common law as the
rule of decision in all courts of this state.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
The facts of this case are simple and uncomplicated.

The

controversy arises in connection with the sale of an office
building in Murray, Utah.
the buyer.
seller.

Plaintiff and appellant (Pam Joy) was

Defendant and appellee (5900 Associates) was the

The only issue in the litigation involves a claim for a

roof warranty.

Pam Joy claims that the seller orally represented

that the building had been recently re-roofed, and agreed to
provide buyer with a 5-year warranty from Layton Roofing Company
(R-2, 74). The warranty was never provided, and Pam Joy thereupon filed this action and alleged some 8 causes of action in its
complaint (R-2).
After the filing of plaintiff's complaint, defendant moved
for summary judgment alleging that there was no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that plaintiff could not as a matter of
law prevail on any of its numerous theories (R-18).

The trial

court agreed, and after briefing and oral argument, granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment (R-102).
The undisputed material facts upon which 5900 Associates
relied, and continues to rely on appeal, are as follows:
1.

On June 30, 1993, Pam Joy purchased an office building

from 5900 Associates in Murray, Utah for a purchase price of
$1,420,000.00 (R-35).
2.

Addendum I attached hereto is a copy of the preliminary

Earnest Money Sales Agreement covering the purchase and sale of
- 3 -

the building.
3.

Paragraph 6 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement pro-

vides that the sale is to be made with "none" warranties except
for the HVAC Mechanical System (see Addendum I).
4.

Addendum II attached hereto is a copy of the Closing

Statement and final Contract between the parties.
5.

Paragraph 3 of the final Contract provides that buyer is

purchasing the property in "as is" condition except for the
repair items and warranties as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the contract (see Addendum II).
6.

Addendum III attached hereto is a copy of the Warranty

Deed covering the sale of the property.
7.

Neither the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the final

contract, nor the Warranty Deed obligate the seller to provide
any roof warranty (see Addendums I, II and III).
8.

Pam Joy has alleged by affidavit that seller's agent,

Barlow Briggs, made various oral representations as claimed in
appellant's brief.

The thrust of the representations were that

the building had recently been re-roofed by Layton Roofing
Company and that the seller would provide buyer with a 5 year
roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company (R-74).

For purposes

of summary judgment seller is required to acknowedge these
allegations as being true.
9.

Briggs acknowledges that there were discussions about

the roof.

He states by affidavit that it was never his
- 4 -

intention, however, for the seller to become legally bound to do
anything other than was provided in the written contract.
to the sale, Layton Roofing had made
ing.

Prior

roof repairs to the build-

Briggs thought he could get a warranty from Layton Roofing,

and, as an accomodation to the buyer, tried to get it.

Briggs

was unsuccessful in getting a roof warranty from Layton Roofing
(R-42).
10.

The roof of the building has not leaked, deteriorated,

or otherwise failed since the sale in June of 1993, and is not in
need of repair or replacement (R-43).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
5900 Associates arguments on appeal may be summarized as
follows:
1.

The written agreements of the parties provide that the

office building is purchased "as is". The written contracts also
specifically negate any warranties, except those that are specifically enumerated.

The contracts are unambiguous and cannot be

varied by parol evidence.
2.

Under the doctrine of merger, preliminary agreements, if

any, are merged into the final written contract.
3.

Pam Joy's claim for intentional misrepresentation must

fail because (a) there cannot as matter of law have been any
reasonable reliance, (b) there was no misrepresentation of a
presently existing fact, (c) an intent to deceive cannot as a
matter of law be based upon inconclusive evidence, and (d) no
- 5 -

damages have been suffered by the buyer.

The lack of any one of

these elements would be fatal to Pam Joy's fraud claim.
4.

The elements to establish negligent mispresentation are

essentially the same as the elements of fraud, except that the
representation is made negligently rather than knowingly.

Thus

the negligence claim must fail by reason of the same missing
elements as enumerated in paragraph 3 above.
5.

With respect to the reformation claim, the drafting of

the final contract was essentially the same as the preliminary
contract.

There could be no showing of any mutual mistake in

connection with the drafting of the final contract, and there was
no prejudice to the buyer.
6.

Plaintiff cannot meet its burden to prove fraud or facts

justifying reformation by clear and convincing evidence.
7.

The trial court properly granted defendant's motion for

summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE BARRED
BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The caption of Point I of Appellant's brief states that
"Plaintiff's Fraud Claims are Not Barred by the Parol Evidence
Rule or Merger".

Appellee has never claimed otherwise.

parol evidence rule is a contract principle.
principle.

The

Fraud is a tort

On appeal, appellant has created confusion by

intermingling the two concepts.
- 6 -

Pam Joy's causes of action for Declaratory Judgment,
Promissory Estoppel, Breach of Oral Contract, and Specific
Performance all sound in contract, not tort.

The trial court

properly applied the parol evidence rule to grant summary judgment on the contract claims.

Such judgment was based upon the

following undisputed facts:
Paragraph 3 of the final contract (Addendum II) provides as
follows:
"Buyer accepts the building in an "as is" condition, except
as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) listed above".
Paragraph (1) relates to repairs and requires the seller to
make enumerated repairs to the parking area; remove discoloration
from the bricks; replace broken bricks; and replace carpet in
certain designated areas. The roof is not listed as one of the
items to be repaired.
Paragraph (2) specifically deals with the subject of warranty and requires the seller to warrant the heating system,
ventilating system, air conditioning system and elevator for a
period of one year.

The roof is not listed as an item to be

warranted.
The final contract as stated above is also in complete
harmony with the written preliminary Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Addendum I) which provides at paragraph 6 for warranty of
the HVAC system2 and for "none" other warranties.

Nor is the

- 7 2

system.

HVAC means heating, ventilating and air conditioning

roof listed in paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
as one of the items to be repaired.
The terms "as is" in the final contract and "none" in the
preliminary contract are not ambiguous. Any supplemental or
separate contract as claimed by appellant would therefore vary
the terms of the unambiguous written contracts.

This strikes at

the heart of the very thing that the parol evidence rule says
cannot be done.
Appellant has relied upon and quoted extensively from the
Arizona case of Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 744 P.2d 22
(Ariz. App. 1987).
Formento holding.

Appellee has no quarrel at all with the
Under Formento the seller of a lot fraudulent-

ly concealed the fact that the subject lot had height restrictions under circumstances where all of the parties were aware
that the buyer was purchasing the lot for the purpose of building
a two story building.

The court held that the seller could not

hide behind the parol evidence rule to escape claims of intentional or negligent misrepresentation.

The court also applied a

tort analysis properly holding that the parol evidence rule was
no defense to a misrepresentation claim.

The difference between

Formento and the instant case is that here the court did in fact
make a tort analysis and found certain elements of fraud to be
missing.

Having done so, there would likewise be no fraud to

consider in a contract analysis.
In this appeal it is not particularly significant whether
- 8 -

fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule.
specific tort claim based upon fraud.

Pam Joy made a

Appellee has never claimed

that extrinsic or parol evidence cannot be used to prove fraud.
The trial court found based upon plaintiff's parol affidavit
evidence that as a matter of law fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, did not exist.

If there is no fraud, then

appellant's argument with respect to a fraud exception to the
contract claim is moot3.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER
A separate legal basis for the denial of plaintiff's claims
is the doctrine of merger.

This concept establishes the

completeness of the final contracts and deed by extinguishing all
antecedent agreements, whether written or oral.

It is said that

the purpose of the merger doctrine is to preserve the integrity
of the final documents of conveyance and encourage the diligence
of the parties.
1993).

Embassy Group vs. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah

Indeed it has been stated:

"Ordinarily, a final contract does represent the final
meeting of the minds, and in it are merged all the
terms expressing the final intention of the parties
and any augmentations. If there are inconsistencies
between the terms of the preliminary and final contracts,
those of the latter will ordinarily govern".
- 9 -

3

See Point III of this brief for arguments and authorities
upholding the trial court's summary determination of no
fraud.

Mawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951).
It is possible that many things were discussed during the
negotiations between the parties.
all real estate transactions.

Such is usually the case in

But a final contract eventually

emerged that was clear and unambiguous.

Based upon the final

contract, a warranty deed was given to the buyer.

The doctrine

of merger would now recognize the final contract to be just that
—

a final contract.
Appellee does not claim that the merger doctrine would bar a

claim for fraud.

What is claimed is that the court has deter-

mined as a matter of law that the necessary elements of fraud do
not exist in this case.

So again (as was shown under Point I) if

there was no fraud the fraud issue becomes unimportant with
respect to any contract claim.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH FRAUD AS A MATTER OF LAW
In the trial court the plaintiff argued both contract and
tort theories.

On appeal, however, the contract claims seem to

have been abandoned (except for the reformation claim) and the
emphasis has shifted to the claims of intentional misrepresentation (otherwise known as fraud) and negligent misrepresentation.
Thus, the fraud analysis becomes the most important part of the
appeal.
Under Utah law, the well established elements of fraud are:
(1) A representation.
- 10 -

(2) Of a presently existing fact.
(3) Which was false.
(4) Which the representor knew to be false.
(5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon
it.
(6) And the other party acted reasonably.
(7) And did in fact rely upon it.
(8) And was thereby induced to act.
(9) And was damaged.
See Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App.
1994; Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah
App. 1987); Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance, 770 P.2d
88 (Utah App. 1958).
It is the position of the appellee that elements (2), (4),
(6) and (9) are missing in this case as a matter of law.

The

absence of any one of these elements would be fatal to the
appeal.
A.

Absence of Representation of a Presently Existing Fact.

The misrepresentation claimed in this case is that the seller's
agent, Barlow Brigs, orally represented that the buyer would be
provided with a 5 year roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company.
Plaintiff also claims that Briggs represented that the building
had been recently re-roofed.
With respect to providing the roof warranty this clearly,
obviously and on its face is not a representation of a presently
- 11 -

existing fact. At best it is a representation of something to be
performed in the future.

Utah case authority clearly holds that

misrepresentation of intended future performance is not a "presently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud can be based.
Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 247 U.A.R. 31 (Sept. 1994);
Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994).
A review of plaintiff's trial brief (R-53) and of
plaintiff's oral argument (R-135-142) indicates that it was the
failure to get a roof waranty that was the big item of concern.
The alleged representation as to the building having been
recently re-roofed was hardly even mentioned.

However, on

appeal, it is now this latter fact (which is all they have) that
is being clinged to in a last minute effort to try to save the
case.
With respect to the re-roofing, Barlow Briggs on behalf of
the seller, submitted his sworn affidvit stating that he had
personally managed the property, and was familiar with the
condition of the roof and that prior to the sale Layton Roofing
Company "had made extensive roof repairs to the building" and
that the roof was in good condition (R-42,43).
Buyer's opposing affidvit, submitted by Alan Smalley, does
not claim any problem with the roof, or that the roof is not in
good condition, or that it needs any repair, but merely alleges
that Briggs told him that sellers had re-roofed the entire
building.

He then states in his affidavit at paragraph 14 (R-77)
- 12 -

the following:
"Pam Joy recently discovered that Layton Roofing did
not re-roof the entire roof of the building, but rather
made only certain limited repairs thereto".
It is appellee's position that the above is without foundation of any kind, is based upon hearsay (alleges recent discovery
with no indication of personal knowledge), is conclusory, and is
vague (in that the term "limited repairs", without further
explanation is meaningless).

This affidavit sentence upon which

the appellant must rely can hardly meet the requirements of Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which, according to the case
law, requires that affidavits used in determining summary judgments must set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence,
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968); must not
be conclusory, Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); and
must be based upon personal knowledge and not unsubstantiated
beliefs, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).

But

even if the affidavit is to be considered it is plaintiff's
position that the difference between "extensive repairs"
(plaintiff's version) and "re-roofing of the entire building"
(defendant's version) is insignificant under circumstances where
no claim is made as to any repair needs or defect to the roof.
In summary under this sub-heading plaintiff claims that the
real alleged misrepresentations do not involve presently existing
facts; that the only misrepresentation that could conceivably be
of a presently existing fact is lacking in significance and
- 13 -

materiality; and that in any event plaintiff's opposing affidavit
is so lacking in evidenciary substance that it cannot be
considered.
B.

Absence of an Intent to Decieve.

The recent case of

Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1994) holds that,
even at the summary judgment stage, that there must be sufficient
evidence to support each and every element of a fraud case by
clear and convincing evidence.

The court further held that an

intent to deceive cannot be inferred by doubtful, vague, speculative or inconclusive evidence.

Thus in Andalex where promises

for the payment of future compensation were allegedly made with a
fraudulent intent at the time made, this court affirmed the
dismissal of the fraud claim for lack of any real evidence that
would demonstrate such a fraudulent intent.
In the instant case, Briggs has sworn that extensive repairs
had been made to the roof; that he thought he could get a warranty from the roofer and tried to get one as an accomodation to the
buyer; but that it was never his intention that such be part of
the sales contract.

And it was in fact excluded from the sales

contract.
Plaintiff alleges that it was told by Briggs that the
building had been re-roofed, but, as pointed out under Point IIIB, appellee views this difference to be negligable.

Plaintiff

now claims that the repairs were "limited" but gives no
explanation as to what that means.
- 14 -

There is no claim that Briggs

concealed any condition of the roof, and in fact there is not
even a claim that any defective condition exists.
Bottom line is that plaintiff has offered nothing of
substance that could possibly meet the burden of establishing an
intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence.

That being

so, then, according to Andalex the summary judgment and dismissal
of the fraud claim must be affirmed.
C.

Absence of Reasonable Reliance.

The absence of reasona-

ble reliance is an exceptionally strong point for appellee, and
is supported by recent authority from the Court of Appeals that
is precisely in point.
The authority upon which appellee relies is Maack v. Resource Design and Construction Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App.
1994).

That case involved the sale of a newly constructed house.

Seller orally represented to buyer that there was a one year
builders warranty that would go with the house.

But the written

contract provided that the house was being3purchased "as is". It
turned out that there were a number of construction defects and
the builder refused to recognize any warranty extending to the
new purchaser.

So, (as was done exactly in the instant case)

suit was filed against the seller alleging negligent misrepresentation and fraud.
A motion for summary judgment was filed by the seller and
granted by the trial court.

In affirming the summary judgment

the Court of Appeals held that the "as is" clause in the written
- 15 -

contract negated the element of reasonable reliance.

In other

words, the court held that by agreeing to purchase "as is" and by
not requiring any reference to the warranty in the written
agreement, and by never having looked at or reviewed the builders
warranty prior to the sale, that the buyer could not —
matter of law —

as a

have reasonably relied upon the oral representa-

tion.
Appellant has made a feeble attempt in its brief to
distinguish Maack from the facts here.

However, appellee would

submit that the facts in the instant case are stronger, not
weaker, in establishing an absence of reasonable reliance.

Those

facts are:
1.

This sale involved a building costing $1,420,000.00.

Buyer is a Realty Company from Beverly Hills California.

It is

fair to assume that the buyer had some degree of sophistication,
and there is no claim to the contrary.
2.

Here the buyer signed not only one, but two separate

written contracts negating the extistence of warranties.

The

preliminary Earnest Money Agreement dated May 21, 1993 provided
for "none" warranties, and the final contract of June 30, 1993
provided for the purchase "as is". The existence of two consistent contracts, separated by a period of more than two months
certainly weakens any claim of reasonable reliance upon claimed
representations that are totally inconsistent.
3.

In this case the buyer required the seller to
- 16 -

specifically warrant certain items —

namely the heating system,

ventilating system, air conditioning system and elevator.

This

is not a case where the subject of warranty was overlooked in
preparing contracts.

The existence of specific warranties,

together with the contractual recitations that there are no other
warranties, makes appellant's position very hard to buy.
4.

Although Alan Smalley claims that he asked for the roof

warranty the hard undisputed fact remains that he never got it,
never saw it, never examined it, and never knew for sure what was
in it. Yet appellant went ahead with two separate contracts
agreeing to purchase the property "as is".
5.

Appellant states by affidavit (R-75,76, paragraphs 5 and

8) that the representations by Briggs took place prior to the
sale, which would have been approximately May 21, 1993 (alleged
letters having been dated in April 1993).

Buyer therefore signed

the Earnest Money Agreement knowing that no roof warranty had
ever been furnished.

After not getting it the first time, buyer

had a second opportunity to get it before executing documents if
it was something of any importance.
6.

Obviously it wasn't.

Expanding on paragraph 5 above, it might also be argued

that once having relied upon a representation and being disappointed in not getting what was allegedly promised, that a
sophisticated buyer cannot reasonably continue to extend the same
reliance, and blissfully go about signing written contracts which
are directly contradictory.

There comes a point where a party
- 17 -

must be held to its written contracts.
7.

The opportunity to inspect the roof prior to sale; the

condition of the roof; the fact that no roof failure was
anticipated; and the fact that the roof is still in good
condition give further perspective to the insignificance of the
warranty issue and the lack of reliance on the part of the buyer.
This case cannot be distinguished from Maack, and if anything, is a stronger case supporting lack of reliance.

It would

be impossible in this case for plaintiff to meet its burden of
showing by clear and convincing evidence that it was reasonable
to rely upon oral statements that contradicted the terms of two
written contracts.
D.

Absence of Damages.

One of the elements of every tort

case, including fraud, is the element of damages.

Conder v. A.L.

Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987).
It is undisputed in this case that the roof is in good
condition, does not leak, and is not in need of repair or
replacement.

Plaintiff has never claimed any roof failure, or

that it leaks, or that it is in need of repair, or that there is
any real jeopardy that it will not last at least 5 years from the
date of sale (R-43).
In light of the above undisputed facts, defendant argued,
and the trial court so found, that no damages were suffered.
Appellant now argues that even though there has been no roof
failure it is entitled to the cost of a warranty, which, accord- 18 -

ing to its unfoundationed hearsay affidavit, is $19,000.00.
Appellee finds a number of problems with this argument, even
assuming that the affidavit would be considered.
The first problem with appellant's argument is that if the
court finds any misrepresentation at all, it would have to be the
alleged representation that the building had been entirely reroofed.

The claimed representation of providing a warranty

cannot possibly qualify as a representation of a presently
existing fact, so the arbitory cost of whatever Layton Roofing
might charge for a roof warranty would have no materiality in a
fraud context.

In other words, if the promise to provide a

warranty in the future isn't fraud, then the cost of a warranty
couldn't be a measure of damage. Damage would have to flow from
the representations that constitute fraud.

And if the condition

of the roof was somehow misrepresented, no damages could exist
absent a showing that there is something wrong with the roof.
But, for the sake of argument, if the appellee were to
concede every other point to the appellant, and were to assume an
obligation existed to provide a warranty, still there could be no
damage in this case. Appellee likens this case to the simple
principle under agency law that imposes personal liability upon
an agent who makes a promise for a principal without authority.
The very same principle applies here.

If as a part of the

contract the seller promised to provide a roofing warranty from
Layton Roofing Company, and if there is an obligation to provide
- 19 -

the warranty, and if the seller cannot deliver, then the seller
becomes obligated on the warranty and would be liable for whatever isn't delivered.

Under this scenario, the seller now steps

into the shoes of Layton Roofing and becomes the warrantor.
Buyer has its warranty, except that it now looks to the seller
rather than to Layton.

But until the roof fails, buyer has no

more of a claim against the seller than it would have had against
Layton Roofing.
The above analysis also fits in with the concept of mitigation.

Layton Roofing Company isn't free to establish some damage

figure out of the sky by charging whatever it wants for a warranty.

The buyer would be required to mitigate by taking its

warranty from someone else —

which in this case would be the

seller.
The above of course assumes that the seller has an obligation to provide a warranty in the first place, which it doesn't.
But in any event there can be no scenario of damages, and absent
damages, there can be no claim.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
AS A MATTER OF LAW
The elements to establish negligent misrepresentation are
basically the same as the elements of fraud, except that the
representation is made negligently rather than knowingly.
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1993).
The above being so, the arguments under Point III of this
- 20 -

brief apply equally to plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation.

Specifically, the absence of a representation of a

presently existing fact, the absence of reasonable reliance, or
the absence of damages would preclude any claim for negligent
misrepresentation.
POINT V
THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS TO JUSTIFY A
REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT
Plaintiff, as an alternative remedy, seeks to reform the
written contract by adding provisions that would require the
seller to provide a roof warranty.

Reformation, however, is not

a remedy that is appropriate for this case.
In approaching a reformation analysis the following basic
legal concepts must be applied:
1.
apply.

Reformation is a remedy the courts are reluctant to
It is exercised sparingly and with utmost caution.

66

Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, §3; Briags vs. Liddell,
699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985).

It is often said that "Reformation is

a remedy not easily won".

National Union Fire Ins. Co. vs. D&L

Construction Company, 353 F.2d 169.
2.

The facts upon which reformation is based must be plead

with particularity.
Rules of
3.

Briggs vs. Liddell, supra; Rule 9(b), Utah

Civil Procedure.
The mutual mistake (or other basis for reformation) must

be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Briaas vs. Lidell,

supra; Bown vs. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984).
- 21 -

For a matter

to be clear and convincing a mind "must at least have reached the
point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to
the correctness of the conclusion".

Greener vs. Greener, 116

Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949); M.U.J.I. 2.19.
4.

Unless there is fraud or inequitable conduct,

if reformation is based upon a mistake, it must be a mutual
mistake and not a unilateral mistake.

"The mistake of only one

party to an instrument, as occurred here, will not afford relief
by reformation".

Briggs vs. Liddell, supra; see also, Bown vs.

Loveland, supra.
5.

Inasmuch as the relief sought by reformation is to make

the agreement conform to the real intention of the parties, there
must be a preliminary or antecedent agreement furnishing the
basis for the rectification.

The mistake must then be in the

drafting of the instrument, not in the making of the contract.
66 Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments, §§ 4, 13.
6.

A mistake to justify reformation must be material, or

something that substantially affects the rights and obligations
of the parties.

There must also be a showing of prejudice to the

complaining party.

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Reformation of Instruments,

§14.
In the perspective of the above concepts, what are the facts
of the instant case?
Antecedent Agreement and Mutual Mistake.

In looking at the

final written contract of June 30, 1993 with its "as is" and
- 22 -

limitation of warranty provisions, we find the existence of an
antecedent contract of May 21, 1993 —
Sales Agreement.

namely the Earnest Money

The antecedent agreement, however, is perfectly

consistent with the final contract and refutes by its very terms
what plaintiff now seeks to change by reformation.

So plaintiff

is now faced with the rather serious problem of having to reform
not one, but two unambiguous written contracts.

There has never

been a claim that plaintiff did not read or did not understand
either of the written contracts. No one is laboring under any
dispute about the contract terms. There is no ignorance of any
facts; plaintiff knew that it didn't have a roof warranty when
its agent signed the written agreements, and knew that the
agreements did not provide for a roof warranty.

No claim has

been made that the draftsman of either written contracts made any
mistake or omitted something that he was told to put in.
In reality plaintiff's claim doesn't go to a mutual mistake
at all. At best it is a claim on an entirely separate oral
contract frought with its own parol evidence, lack of
consideration, merger and other legal problems.
doesn't fit into the category of reformation.

But it just

And on top of all

this is Briggs' affirmative affidavit that it was never his
intention to become bound to anything other than what was provided in the written contract, and that his unsuccesful attempt to
get a roof warranty was nothing more than an accomodation to the
buyer.

While it is true that Briggs' affidavit isn't per se
- 23 -

binding on the court and could be overcome by conflicting evidence, there is simply no evidence in this case to do so or to
overcome plaintiff's heavy burden which must be met by clear and
convining evidence.
Materiality and Prejudice.

Plaintiff claims the cost of a

roof warranty from Layton Roofing Company would be $19,000. This
is not a proper measure of damage4, but even if it were, it
represents only slightly more than 1% of the purchase price of
the building.
able.

The materiality therefor becomes highly question-

At least we know that the buyer did not consider it

material enough to include in either of the two written contracts.
And as to the element of prejudice, there is no claim that
there is even anything wrong with the roof.5

No prejudice is

therefore shown.
This lawsuit is comparatively so trivial that it just cannot
rise to the level where such a limited and unfavorable remedy of
reformation would be proper.
Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Plaintiff has attempted to

brush away its clear and convincing evidence problem by simply
stating that it has raised an issue of fact.
plaintiff misses the point.

But in doing so,

This is not a case of which party
- 24 -

4
5

See argument at Point III D of this brief.

This is an undisputed fact (R-43).
Point III D of this brief.

Also see argument at

can be the most persuasive in convincing a fact finder whether a
mistake was or was not made.
burden of proof.
matter of law —

It is a case of meeting one's

It is a case of whether plaintiff —

as a

can establish that its case is so clear that

there could be no substantial doubt.

It is defendant's position,

in light of the affirmative affidavit of Briggs; the existence of
two written contracts; the clear and unambiguous language of the
contracts; the second opportunity of plaintiff to correct any
mistake; the lack of materiality and/or prejudice; and the
vagueness, as well as the hearsay nature of plaintiff's opposing
affidavit, that reasonable minds could simply never conclude that
plaintiff's position is so clear and convincing that it is
without doubt as to its correctness.
This case is not different in principle from Neeley vs.
Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979).

In Neeley the trial court,

after hearing the evidence of the parties, found that the parties
were entitled to reform a deed.

The case, however, was reversed

on appeal, even though the parties testified that they were to
receive certain land, on the ground that the mistake was not
clear.

The burden to show mistake by clear and convincing evi-

dence had not been met.
Plaintiff, of course, is entitled to all of the usual
presumptions of a losing party under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (Summary Judgment).

But given those presumptions in

light of the facts here it would be impossible to establish by
- 25 -

clear and convincing evidence that the elements for a reformation
could be met,
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and authorities as outlined in this
brief, appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C., respectfully urges that
the summary judgment granted by the trial court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST

By

S/^UZMJL

David E. West
1300 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellees
5900 Associates, L.C.
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I hereby certify that, on the

S* day of April, 1995, two

true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 5900
Associates, L.C. were served upon the following:
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
G. Richard Hill, Esq.
J. Mark Gibb, Esq.
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar
50 South Main Street, #850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Seller:

5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability
compaay

Buyer:

RPM Investments, Inc., a California corporation

Property:

201 East 5900 South, Murray, Utah, 84107

Closing Date:

June 30, 1993

1.

Purchase Price

$1,420,000.00

2.

Assignment of Seller's escrow account

8,650.31

3. Pre-paid insurance

1,427.00

4.

1,098.00

Pre-paid utility deposits (Murray City)

5.

$1,431,175.31

Less:
6.

Trust Deed Balance

7.

Seller's pro-rata share of
1993 property taxes

7,440.75

Pre-paid security deposits

7,200.00

8.

$896,000.00

910,640.75
9-

Seller's Equity

$520,534.56

Charges to Seller at Closing
10.

1/2 of loan assumption fee

11.

1/2 of title insurance premium

12.

1/2 of closing fees to Armstrong, Rawlings
& West

$ 4,480.00
1,183.50

500.00

13.

Real estate commission

50,000.00

14.

Recording of documents

25.00

15.

Escrow for improvements

30,000.00

EXHIBIT ' B "

16.

250.00

1/2 of escrow fee

$86,438.50

17#

Charges to Buyer at Closing
18.

1/2 of loan assumption fee

19.

1/2 of title insurance premium

20.

1/2 of closing fees to Armstrong, Rawlings
& West

21.

Recording of documents

22.

1/2 of escrow fee

$ 4,480.00
1,183.50
500.00
25.00
250.00

23.

$ 6,438.50

AMOUNT DUE FROM BUYER TO^CLOSE
(Line 9 plus line 23]f

$526^973.06

AMOUNT PAYABLE TO SELLER AT CLOSING
(Line 9 less line 17)

$434,096.06

Supplemental Contract Provisions
Seller and buyer each agree to the following:
1. Seller agrees to make the following repairs to the
property:
a) Repairing the parking lot area, by resurfacing and
sealing against present leaking condition. Seller will provide
Buyer with Contractors guarantee that this work has been completed and warranted against future water leakage for at least one
year.
b)

Remove all discoloration from brick areas.

c)

Replace and repair all broken brick in walls and build-

d)

Replace carpet on second floor common area hallway.

ing.
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e) Seller shall deposit into escrow with Armstrong,
Rawlings & West acting as fiduciary afld escrow agent, the sum of
$30,000 to guaranty completion of these improvements • These
escrowed JEiinds-shall be returned to sailer when these improvements haveab&en completed and. a release has been signed by the
Buyer*
2. Seller shall warrant the Heating, Ventilating and Air
Conditioning^systems including all mechanical mechanisms involved
with these systems, and the Elevator, against breakdown for a
period ,oj^gvne^year. Warranty shall not include routine maintenance, ^^^^^pconditional upon Buyer having a Contractual
AgreementBo.^ a contractor to have these systems serviced on a
quarterly *basis.
3^ ^og^^accepts thefbuilding in an t!as is* condition,
except as^l^xded in paragraphs (1) and (2) listed above.
4. Buyfer agrees to assume all obligations under Seller's
existing note and trust deed with St. Paul Federal Bank for
Savings. Seller represents that the balance due is $896,000.00.
5. ^^^^^o shall pay all interest on the existing note and
trust dee^^^^xine 30, 1993*
6. . Seller acknowledges receipt of a Guaranty Agreement
dated Marchf^ly 1992 wherein Barlow Briggs, Max D. Scheel, Bert
N. Smith, ^Blaine R. Hale and Kent Howard have personally guaranteed an amount up to 10% of any principal default on the existing
note and jtrust deed to St. Paul Federal Bank for Savings. Buyer
shall indemnify and hold the guarantors harmless from any liability under the Guarantee Agreement; and in addition, and as a
condition of this sale, shall deliver to seller and guarantors at
closing an ^agreement in writing wherein Alan Smalley of Beverly
Hills, Califoiiiia, personally agrees to indemnify and hold
guarantors^armless from any future liability under the Guaranty
Agreement•
7. Seller herewith delivers to Buyer all existing leases on
the premises, and assigns to Buyer all of its interest in and to
said leases.
8. All;taxes, insurance and rents shall be pro-rated as of
date of closing. Existing insurance shall be assigned to Buyer.
9. Any^efaulting party to this agreement shall pay all of
the costs ana, expenses of enforcing the same, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred for enforcement or in connection
with any breach.
- 3 -

10. Seller and Buyer recognize that Dr. P a y n e , in Suite
#206, has not as of this time signed a new lease o r an extension
to his old lease. Seller hereby agrees to have this suite leased
and will pay the leasing commission to a licensed real estate
agent o r broker to have this accomplished. Buyer agrees that if
the Seller is able to lease this space through his own effort Tand
ability, then the paying of any commission for leasing will be
excused. If, however, Seller is unable to or that this suite is
not leased within sixty (60) days from the lease7expiration, a
licensed real estate broker or agent will be commissioned to do
the leasing. The Buyer will approve the selection of the real
estate broker to market this property. Seller^s obligation ±p^,
pay a commission shall be limited to t h e commission apportionia&Le
to the first three years of the lease.
11Primary
the event this lease is not renewed, Seller guarantees p a y m i n t ^
rent for a period of one year. Buyer shall make diligent efforts
to release this space so as to mitigate S e l l e r s obligation. The
obligation under this paragraph shall b e secured b y a cash
deposit, or a letter of credit from a reputable bank, in the
amount of $55,000.00, which shall b e deposited with Armstrong^
Rawlings & West a s fiduciary and escrows agent*
12. Buyer will give Briggs R e a l t y ^ a n e x c l u s i v e listingj^o
lease the space now occupied by D r . Bradley, if D r . Bradley *~~"~
elects to vacate his preent suite at the expiration of his
present lease contract. Briggs Realty will receive a five
percent (5%) commission if an acceptable tenant is found. This
exclusive listing will be valid for sixty (60) days from the
signing of this listing.

DATED this 3> O day of

L

1993.
5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C.

^

anagerC^
Its Mana
SELLER

RPM INVESTMENTS, INC.
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The undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of
this agreement and agrees to act as an escrow agent in accordance
with paragraphs 1 and 11 herein.
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST

CLQ%.UX/
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WARRANTY DEED

5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
with its principal office at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Grantor, hereby coveys and warrants to Pam Joy
Realty, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of California, with its principal office at Beverly
Hills, Los Angeles County, State of California, Grantee, for the
sum of TEN ($10.00) DOLLARS and other valuable consideration, the
following described tract; of land in Salt Lake County, State of
i* Utah:
BEGINNING at a point on the North Right of Way Line of
5900 South Street South 1162.23 feet and West 911.28
feet from the calculated center of Section 18, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, City
of Murray, Utah; thence North 8*53'30fl East 150.00 feet;
thence South 81*06'30" East 180.62 feet; thence South
8«53'30P,|#est 150.00 feet to said Right .of^Way; thence North
8 1 # 0 6 > 3 P ^ W e s t 180.62 feet along the Right:' of Way to the'
point of ^BEGINNING.
IN WITNESS'-WHEREOF the undersigned has executed and delivered this Deed on the Z-Pj day of June, 1993.
5900 ASSOCIATES, L.C., a Utah
limited liability company

By.
Its Manager
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

On the 2~*j day of June, 1993, personally appeared before me
Barlow Briggs, who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the
Manger of 5900 Associates, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, that said instrument was signed on behalf of said limited
liability company and said Barlow Briggs acknowledged to me that
said company executed the same.

My Comission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
NOTARY PUBLKT""!

BARBARA B. HALL '
\

Armstrong Rawlings & West I
^ 1300 Walker Center
I
Salt 1 a k p
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